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ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 
N a t i o n a l I n s u r a n c e : How t o Get Rid of a Bad Tax 
Successive governments have a t tempted to conceal from the publ ic the t rue 
n a t u r e of n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e p a y m e n t s , which in 1979/1980 a r e e x p e c t e d t o 
exceed £19,000m. Though termed ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s ' , implying t h e i r payment i s 
vo lun ta ry , for employees they are a form of income tax ; for employers they 
a re a form of c o r p o r a t e t a x . Governments make g r e a t p lay of any ( r e a l or 
i l l u s o r y ) r e d u c t i o n in income t ax but t he s e e m i n g l y i n e x o r a b l e r i s e in 
na t iona l insurance ' c o n t r i b u t i o n s ' i s much l e s s p u b l i c i s e d . To government 
t h i s s o u r c e has a lways appea red a p a i n l e s s way of r a i s i n g r evenue w i t h o u t 
los ing v o t e s . As a r e s u l t these c o n t r i b u t i o n s now exceed VAT payments by a 
s i g n i f i c a n t amount and have grown from 44% of t he income t ax t a k e in 1970 t o 
66% in 1979. Indeed employers c o n t r i b u t i o n s in the l a t t e r year (£9,l89m) 
were only m a r g i n a l l y l e s s than the t r a d i n g p r o f i t s of companies and 
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ! 
N a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e i s a t h o r o u g h l y bad t ax and ought to be r e p l a c e d . I t s 
d i s a d v a n t a g e s a r e l e g i o n . F i r s t l y i t i s a r e g r e s s i v e t a x . That i s , t he 
r i c h e r you a r e , t h e s m a l l e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n of your income you c o n t r i b u t e . 
This a r i s e s because c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e l e v i e d only on t h e f i r s t £200 of 
weekly income. So a man e a r n i n g £20,000 pays no more than a man e a r n i n g 
£11,000. This c o n t r a v e n e s t h e a c c e p t e d n o t i o n t h a t p e r s o n a l t a x a t i o n 
s h o u l d b e a r mos t h e a v i l y on t h o s e b e s t a b l e t o pay . The p r e s e n t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n system does the oppos i t e . 
Secondly, n a t i o n a l insurance reduces the compe t i t iveness of B r i t i s h f i rms 
compet ing a g a i n s t f o r e i g n goods bo th a t home and ab road . I n s u r a n c e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s r a i s e t h e c o s t s of B r i t i s h goods but a r e not p a y a b l e by 
foreign f i rms . 
Thirdly , n a t i o n a l insurance c o n t r i b u t i o n s d i s t o r t the labour market. They 
o b v i o u s l y w e i g h t most h e a v i l y on f i r m s which a r e l a b o u r i n t e n s i v e , t h u s 
inducing bus ines ses to economise on the amount of labour they employ. This 
seems a perverse e f f e c t a t a t ime of high unemployment. More s u b t l y , they 
induce i n t e n s i v e use of e x i s t i n g labour through over t ime working, again a t 
the expense of increased employment. 
F i n a l l y , the n a t i o n a l insurance scheme as admin is te red p re sen t ly undermines 
the automat ic s t a b i l i s i n g t endenc ies of the economy. Mechanisms which pump 
spending power i n to the economy during a r ecess ion and take i t out during a 
boom are termed au tomat ic s t a b i l i s e r s . The n a t i o n a l insurance scheme, by 
making payments t o an i n c r e a s i n g number of unemployed d u r i n g a s lump, i s 
f r e q u e n t l y t h o u g h t t o f u l f i l l t h i s r o l e by r e p l a c i n g l o s t spend ing power. 
This view i s t e n a b l e only i f t h e government i s w i l l i n g t o run a d e f i c i t on 
the n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e fund. The p r e s e n t gove rnmen t , by r e d u c i n g t h e 
exchequer c o n t r i b u t i o n to t he fund from 18% t o 14% and by i n c r e a s i n g 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s , seem by c o n t r a s t t o be wedded t o t he n o t i o n of a s e l f -
f inancing system. 
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Given all these disadvantages, how could the scheme be replaced? The most 
obvious route would be to subsume contributions within the existing tax 
system. For the employee, contributions could be made payable through the 
income tax system. At present, this would imply a standard rate of 37% or 
alternatively one might spread the load across the various tax bands, thus 
making the system more progressive if desired. This proposal has the 
advantage that all compulsory deductions are combined into one clearly 
defined tax rate, thus considerably reducing the scope of the Chancellor to 
surreptitiously reduce take home pay. 
Employers' existing contributions could be replaced by a change in the VAT 
system. One way of achieving this would be to widen the scope of the VAT 
system and/or increase the rate. For example, extending VAT at the current 
rate to those items currently exempt or zero rated would be sufficient to 
replace existing employers contributions. The competitiveness of British 
industry would thus be significantly improved, since VAT is levied on both 
domestic and foreign goods and can be recouped on UK exports. 
Further economy-wide attractions of these changes include reduced 
administrative costs as the funds would be collected through the existing 
income tax and VAT network. Distortions in the labour market would also be 
reduced, the bias against labour intensive industry vanishing and the 
incentive to offer overtime work greatly diminished. To the government, 
though increasing the degree of scrutiny to which revenue raising measures 
are subjected, the proposed changes offer increased flexibility in pursuing 
genuinely countercyclical policies. 
There are, of course, disadvantages. Most important of these would be the 
initial inflationary impact of the increase in VAT. But as employers came 
to gradually realise that there had not been any overall increase in their 
costs, domestic prices would subsequently grow more slowly. The price of 
imported goods would remain at the new, higher level. At most, the 
immediate effect of the proposal outlined above would be to raise the retail 
price index by 6%. In all probability the increase would be considerably 
less. Taken together, the objections seem lightweight when compared with 
the positive advantages of scrapping national insurance contributions. The 
present structure ought therefore to be changed. The difficulty will be to 
persuade the government that the public will no longer tolerate the use of 
the national insurance scheme as a source of easy revenue. 
D N F Bell 
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